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ARTICLE
PREVENTING AND MANAGING INVESTOR-
STATE CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES IN THE
ENERGY SECTOR
ALEJANDRO CARBALLO LEYDA*
Economic activities, in particular those taking place in sensitive sec-
tors such as energy, are usually highly regulated, resulting in frequent inter-
action of foreign investors with several authorities of the host state at the
federal, national, regional, and local levels—authorities that are at times
competing with each other and that are not always coordinating well. Some-
times these public entities are not very familiar with the international or
contractual obligations (or even unilateral commitments) undertaken by the
state at different levels, so they may inadvertently violate those obligations
or create friction with the investors. On the other hand, companies investing
in foreign countries may also not always be fully aware of the underlying
causes of conflicts and friction between their local subsidiary, project, or
joint venture and the host state. Furthermore, multinationals may also have
several competing and not-always-well-coordinated departments or
projects. This may affect their decision-making process and escalate a con-
flict with local authorities.
Despite the best intentions of companies and states, friction is almost
inevitable over the life of a project. This is particularly true in the energy
sector, which involves large, complex, capital-intensive projects with long
life spans during which there may be several changes of governments, pro-
ject personnel, and even economic circumstances. If not timely and cor-
rectly addressed, conflicts may escalate into full disputes, which often
involve essential public policies, attract great scrutiny by the media, and
implicate claims for substantial monetary damages as well as risks of
reputational damage and loss of investment. The question is not whether an
energy project will have conflicts but how those conflicts will be prevented
and managed (or ultimately solved amicably if they escalate into full dis-
putes). In fact, the energy and mining sectors accounted for more than half
* Alejandro Carballo Leyda (alejandro.carballo@encharter.org) is General Counsel and
Head of the Conflict Resolution Centre and the Energy Charter Secretariat for Brussels (Belgium).
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of the new investment disputes registered by the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 2019.1
Consequently, both states and companies may benefit from introducing
their own internal, binding frameworks to prevent and manage conflicts and
disputes. The World Bank’s Systemic Investment Response Mechanism
(SIRM)2 and the International Energy Charter’s3 Model Instrument for
Management of Investment Disputes4 are two complementary tools that
could be considered for that purpose.
I. CONFLICT PREVENTION, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, OR DISPUTE
MANAGEMENT?
Different institutions and states use different names to refer to preven-
tion and management tools. Therefore, it is important to focus not on the
names of tools but on their functions and the objectives they aim to achieve.
In 2016, the Energy Charter Secretariat published a paper on “best practices
[for] investment conflict prevention and management,”5 describing different
tools already adopted by governments in America, Europe, and Asia.6
Conflict-prevention tools aim at avoiding or minimizing friction before
it transforms into actual conflicts. While they are usually implemented uni-
laterally by the host state, conflict-prevention tools can also be part of an
international agreement with investment provisions. As an example of the
1. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], The ICSID Caseload—Statistics
(Issue 2020-1), at 25 (2020),  https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/Caseload
%20Statistics/en/The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%282020-1%20Edition
%29%20ENG.pdf.
2. World Bank Grp. [WBG], Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Politi-
cal Risk and Policy Responses, at 41–66 (2019), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/33082/Political-Risk-and-Policy-Responses.pdf.
3. The International Energy Charter monitors the implementation of the Energy Charter
Treaty [ECT], which is a unique sector-specific (energy) multilateral treaty establishing legal
rights and obligations concerning a broad range of issues such as investment, trade, transit, com-
petition, the environment, access to capital markets, and transfer of technology. To provide for the
effective enforcement of those rights and obligations, the ECT includes several tailor-made dis-
pute resolution mechanisms. As of February 1, 2019, the ECT has fifty-six signatories and con-
tracting parties, including the European Union. In addition, almost fifty states and regional
intergovernmental organizations from all over the world are observers. Members and Observers to
the Energy Charter Conference, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, https://www.energycharter.org/who-we-
are/members-observers (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
4. For a comment on the Model Instrument, see Alejandro Carballo Leyda, Model Instru-
ment for Management of Investment Disputes, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND POLICY (Julien Chaisse et al. eds., 2019).
5. Energy Charter Secretariat, Best Practices in Investment Conflict Prevention and Man-
agement (2016), https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Other_Publications/
20160926-Investment_Conflict_Prevention_Management.pdf.
6. For additional references on dispute prevention, see U.N. Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (2011), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf
(containing the proceedings from the 2010 Washington and Lee University and UNCTAD Joint
Symposium on International Investment and Alternative Dispute Resolution).
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latter, recent international investment agreements (IIAs) usually establish
joint committees or commissions (composed of government officials and
industry representatives of both states that are party to the international
agreement) that meet at regular intervals to promote the exchange of infor-
mation and discuss potential areas of concern or discomfort. If properly
used, these committees can be an extraordinary tool for conflict prevention.
Stocktaking is an important conflict-prevention tool; it aims to provide
an early, comprehensive analysis of the national investment environment in
the host state. Stocktaking consists of a thorough audit (which should be
continuously updated to incorporate any evolving circumstances) of the reg-
ulatory, institutional, and economic environment and features some of the
following components:
• A clear overview of international legal obligations undertaken
by the host state (such as contracts and international agree-
ments with investment provisions and double taxation
treaties);
• Early analysis of potential gaps between specific provisions of
domestic law and international treaties binding on the state
(e.g., article 10.12 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) re-
quires contracting parties to ensure that their domestic law
provides effective means for the assertion of claims and the
enforcement of rights concerning investments, investment
agreements, and investment authorizations);
• Mapping of the categories of foreign investors currently pre-
sent in the host state’s territory and analysis of the potential
risks stemming thereof;
• A comprehensive study of the problems, conflicts, and dis-
putes the host state experienced in the past, together with the
circumstances in which they happened (a previous example
may not always be a good reference for a later conflict if the
circumstances in which it took place were very different), the
reaction to them, and which solutions worked;
• An overview of the host-state agencies most frequently in-
volved in the conflicts, to consider capacity building and other
measures; and
• Monitoring of sensitive sectors prone to international disputes
or on which the state’s economy may be too dependent (e.g.,
oil, gas, or mining). A useful monitoring tool in the energy
sector is the Energy Investment Risk Assessment (EIRA),7
which evaluates specific risks affecting energy investment that
can be mitigated through adjustments to policy, legal, and reg-
ulatory frameworks. It aims to identify policy gaps, provide
learning opportunities, and stimulate reforms that make the in-
7. See Energy Investment Risk Assessment, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, https://eira.energychar
ter.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2020) (containing annual EIRA reports, individual country profiles,
year-to-year comparisons, and other information).
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vestment climate of countries more robust and reduce the risk
of conflicts with foreign investors. EIRA is primarily ad-
dressed to governments, helping them identify and eliminate
specific risks that impede the inflow of investments but that
can be controlled and limited through government actions.8
EIRA is also a reliable source for energy companies, investors,
and the financial sector, providing useful information on dif-
ferent aspects of the regulatory and legal environment in coun-
tries considered for investment. Currently, EIRA evaluates
three risk areas: (1) unpredictable policy or regulatory change,
(2) discrimination between domestic and foreign investors,
and (3) breach of state obligations. To measure these risks,
four indicators have been identified: (1) the foresight of policy
and regulatory change, (2) management of decision-making
processes, (3) the regulatory environment and investment con-
ditions, and (4) the rule of law (compliance with national and
international obligations).
Of course, a stocktaking exercise would be useless if not combined
with a well-centralized, easily-accessible database and an integrated infor-
mation-sharing mechanism. “Knowledge is power,” but only if it is effi-
ciently and timely shared, in a user-friendly way, with all the relevant actors
involved at all levels: federal, national, regional, and local.
Another important conflict-prevention tool is the individual ex ante
analysis of policy changes affecting foreign investment to facilitate the
identification and monitoring of sensitive issues that could give rise to fric-
tion with investors. In 2017, the Energy Charter Conference,9 recalling the
G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking (2016)10 and
the joint ACP11-UNCTAD12 Guiding Principles for ACP Countries’ Invest-
ment Policymaking (2017),13 endorsed (with the understanding that they are
not to be considered as a soft-law instrument, uniform practices, or non-
binding recommendations) some best practices in regulatory reform that
could minimize potential conflicts with foreign investors.14
8. For information on the scope and methodology of EIRA, see Methodology, INT’L EN-
ERGY CHARTER, https://eira.energycharter.org/data/methodology.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
9. The Energy Charter Conference is the governing and decision-making body of the Inter-
national Energy Charter. Meetings of the Energy Charter Conference, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER,
https://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/energy-charter-conference (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
10. Org. Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Annex III: G20 Guiding Principles for Global In-
vestment Policymaking (2016), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/G20-Guiding-
Principles-for-Global-Investment-Policymaking.pdf.
11. African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States.
12. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
13. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Guiding Principles for ACP Countries’
Investment Policymaking, U.N. Doc. ACP/85/037/17/Rev.1 (May 22, 2017), http://www.acp.int/
sites/acpsec.waw.be/files/Guiding%20Principles%20for%20ACP%20countries.pdf.
14. Int’l Energy Charter, Best Practices in Regulatory Reform: Minimising Potential Con-
flicts with Foreign Investors, CCDEC 2017 4 INV (Oct. 11, 2017), https://
www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2017/CCDEC201704.pdf.
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Conflict-management tools are usually designed to facilitate the reso-
lution of investors’ grievances and actual conflicts at a very early stage,
thereby preventing their escalation into full legal disputes and ensuring ef-
fective allocation of both the investors’ and the host state’s financial re-
sources. An example would be the introduction of a grievance-solving
mechanism such as an investment ombudsman (a role whose duties may
range from formulating general regulatory or statutory proposals to the gov-
ernment based on general concerns received to the amicable settlement of
specific issues at an early stage). The centralization or coordination of
grievance-solving mechanisms allows for the consolidation of the institu-
tional memory of the investment climate and therefore facilitates identifica-
tion of potential regulatory improvements. Additionally, these mechanisms
provide an early-warning system, allowing the host state to better under-
stand the situation and prepare in case the conflict regretfully transforms
into a dispute. Indeed, another key tool for conflict management is an early-
alert or early-warning mechanism with a list of steps to take at the sign of
any conflict (with a clear timeline and some flexibility to adapt to
circumstances).
Most of the existing conflict-prevention and conflict-management
tools can be stand-alone measures, although they may reinforce each other
if adopted in combination. While prevention should be prioritized, it is im-
portant to provide an encompassing and interactive approach. For example,
an online digital platform easily accessible to all relevant public entities
could work both as a centralized database, facilitating information sharing,
and as an early-alert mechanism enabling public entities to inform the re-
sponsible body or lead agency of any potential conflict with foreign inves-
tors. Nevertheless, the threat of cyberattacks at the international level is
nowadays a real risk, especially when states are involved.15 Therefore, spe-
cific measures should be adopted to protect sensitive data from unautho-
rized access and to react promptly in case of a security breach.
If the problem invoked by the investor nonetheless persists and esca-
lates into a full dispute (e.g., the investor notifies the host country of its
intention to submit a claim under the contract, an existing investment agree-
ment, or a local law), then dispute-management tools allow for an effective
and coordinated response from the host state. Sometimes, however, conflict
prevention and dispute management are interrelated and may overlap (e.g.,
additional grievances may arise after a dispute has already started, or a dis-
pute may be defused by negotiation or mediation after the notice of litiga-
tion has been issued). In fact, the potential evolution of grievances into
disputes is not unidirectional (disputes can be defused into conflicts and
15. For example, in Caratube Int’l Oil Co. v. Republic of Kaz., ICISD Case No. ARB 13/13,
Award, ¶¶ 150, 156 (2017), an arbitral tribunal authorized the on-record submission of nonprivi-
leged documents that were part of some 60,000 documents previously hacked from the respon-
dent’s government systems and later leaked onto a publicly available website.
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later into grievances). Sometimes a conflict may be partially solved, reduc-
ing the scope and complexity of the potential dispute.
Independent of the ongoing discussions on potential reforms to the in-
vestor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system, an effective and comprehen-
sive mechanism for conflict prevention, conflict management, and dispute
management is still fundamental. If efficiently implemented and used, it can
significantly improve the general quality, stability, and predictability of the
investment environment, thus increasing investment retention while at-
tracting new investment because of foreign investors’ confidence.
II. WHO COORDINATES THESE TOOLS AND HOW?
Investment conflicts and disputes are usually complex and rarely in-
volve a single public entity, so internal coordination of the public authori-
ties involved is crucial. Furthermore, the contact details of the responsible
official or public agency to whom the investor should address its concerns
are not always publicly available, or when they are available,16 the func-
tions and authority of the entity are not always clear. Thus, the investor may
lose a lot of time trying to reach the relevant entity or entities while those
entities may not be aware of the existence of potential problems with the
foreign investor (in some cases, the investor may send notices to several
ministries or agencies, with the risk that each entity takes for granted that
the others are dealing with the problem). This lack of information and com-
munication may result in the escalation of conflicts into full disputes instead
of their potential resolution at the initial stage.
Therefore, whatever the tools for conflict prevention or management, it
is important that they are coordinated and that a single institution (whose
contact details are publicly available) is identified as being in charge. The
responsible body or lead agency may have a different nature, composition,
and work frame depending on the administrative structure and particular
circumstances of the state it operates within. In some states, it will be an
existing ministry (or a unit or department within a ministry), while in others
it could take the form of a newly created agency or interinstitutional or
interministerial commission.
While some of its functions may vary from one state to another, the
responsible body or lead agency should be a central focal point with enough
competencies, resources, legitimacy, and authority (both legal and political)
to effectively engage with the concerned foreign investor. It is also impor-
tant that the responsible body or lead agency ensures not only the necessary
coordination with other public institutions but also adequate restraint of
other state agencies, making sure that those agencies do not abuse their
16. Some new international investment agreements identify specific agencies that should re-
ceive notifications (e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership, Chapter 9, Annex 9-D) in case of an investor
claim, though it is not clear whether such entities will be in charge of managing such disputes.
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power in dealings with the investor during the resolution of the conflict or
dispute (e.g., through unnecessary audits).17
Furthermore, there is a general trend toward transparency in invest-
ment disputes—which attract great scrutiny by the media and civil soci-
ety—and many states provide their citizens with the ability to get
information, subject to specific national legislation, which can differ in
scope and requirements. However, full transparency regarding investment
conflicts and disputes, in particular at the very early stages, could under-
mine their amicable resolution or even escalate the conflicts. To a great
extent, the reaction of citizens, foreign investors, and political groups to
investment conflicts and disputes depends on how those conflicts and dis-
putes, as well as their background and the way they are being addressed, are
communicated about.
Therefore, it is useful to have a media plan early on (even more so
nowadays, when social media can widely spread a message within hours)
and an identified spokesperson. A press briefing may also be prepared, con-
taining background information and the essential messages about the case
to direct attention to the right issues and avoid inaccuracies and misunder-
standings. The responsible body or lead agency should be the entity in
charge of providing information to third parties with a single voice, since it
can adequately evaluate the consequences of providing particular informa-
tion and, as a result, strategically select what to disclose. In their public
statements and press releases, other agencies and civil servants should avoid
any value judgment about a potential controversy without first consulting
the responsible body or lead agency. Several cases reflect the tension that
sometimes exists between the host state and the foreign investor in relation
to media.18
III. WHAT HAS THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CHARTER DONE TO
FACILITATE THE PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES?
In 2014, the Energy Charter Secretariat was charged with assisting
with good offices,19 mediation, and conciliation and with providing neutral,
17. See Caratube Int’l Oil Co. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Decision
Regarding Claimant’s Application for Provisional Measures (July 31, 2009).
18. See, e.g., Biwater Gauf (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/
05/22, Procedural Order No. 3 (Sept. 29, 2006); United Utilities (Tallinn) B.V. v. Republic of Est.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/24, Decision Regarding Respondent’s Application for Provisional Mea-
sures (May 12, 2016).
19. Good offices are a diplomatic means for the settlement of disputes by which the Secreta-
riat assists in establishing contact or facilitating direct negotiations between the disputing parties.
If the parties request it, the Secretariat can also provide support during the negotiations. Int’l
Energy Charter, Conclusions of the Review conducted under Article 34(7) of the Energy Charter
Treaty, CCDEC2014 06 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/Documents
Media/CCDECS/CCDEC201406.pdf.
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independent legal advice and assistance in dispute resolution. As a result,
the Energy Charter Secretariat established a Conflict Resolution Centre pro-
viding good offices and mediation support for investment disputes.20
During 2015, the Energy Charter Secretariat organized several round-
tables with representatives from governments (in particular, officials in-
volved in dispute resolution or investment promotion) and industry (in
particular, members of the legal, business, and public-relations departments
of energy companies) in order to understand their opinions and experiences
regarding conflict resolution and the use of amicable dispute settlement in
the energy sector. The general, common message in all those roundtables
was the importance of dialogue to solve conflicts amicably before they es-
calate into full claims and to facilitate good long-term relationships.21 How-
ever, the following problems were also raised: (i) the need for effective
implementation of mechanisms to settle disputes amicably, and (ii) the need
to raise awareness of those mechanisms among relevant stakeholders—lack
of knowledge frequently results in lack of confidence and trust.
Building on this work, in 2016 the Energy Charter Conference en-
dorsed the Guide on Investment Mediation as a helpful tool to facilitate the
amicable resolution of investment disputes.22 The guide was prepared by
the Energy Charter Secretariat with the support of several intergovernmen-
tal organizations and international dispute-resolution bodies. These in-
cluded ICSID, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the In-
ternational Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),
the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Centre
for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), and the International Mediation
Institute (IMI). The guide aims to be an explanatory document for govern-
ments and companies to use as a reference to better understand how invest-
ment mediation works so they can make informed decisions about whether
to engage in mediation and how best to prepare for it. The Energy Charter
Conference further “encouraged Contracting Parties to consider [using] me-
diation on a voluntary basis . . . at any stage of [a] dispute to facilitate its
amicable solution and to consider the good offices of the Energy Charter
Secretariat” and “welcomed the willingness of the Contracting Parties to
facilitate effective enforcement in their Area of settlement agreements with
20. Conflict Resolution Centre, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, https://www.energycharter.org/
what-we-do/dispute-settlement/conflict-resolution-centre (last updated Apr. 16, 2019).
21. The Hague Legal Energy Charter Forum, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER (June 5, 2015), https:/
/www.energycharter.org/media/news/article/the-hague-legal-energy-charter-forum; Roundtable—
Settlement of Investment Disputes, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER, https://www.energycharter.org/what-
we-do/events/roundtable-settlement-of-investment-disputes-30-september-2015 (last updated
Sept. 10, 2015).
22. Int’l Energy Charter, Guide on Investment Mediation, CCDEC 2016 12 INV (July 19,
2016), https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2016/CCDEC
201612.pdf.
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foreign investors[,] in accordance with applicable law and the relevant do-
mestic procedures.”23
In 2018, the Energy Charter Secretariat developed a Model Instrument
for Management of Investment Disputes. The Energy Charter Conference
considered that the model instrument would help states enhance their man-
agement of investment disputes while attending to their own particular
needs and circumstances.24 The model instrument is based on discussions
with international institutions and government officials that deal with in-
vestment-dispute resolution, and it draws upon existing work, including
documents from Europe, Asia, and Latin America.25 An initial workshop to
discuss a preliminary draft with government officials from several coun-
tries, the World Bank, UNCITRAL, the Asian African Legal Consultative
Organization (AALCO), and UNCTAD was held by the Energy Charter
Secretariat in Brussels on July 6, 2018. The Energy Charter Secretariat con-
ducted additional discussions during the UNCITRAL Trade Law Forum on
September 11, 2018, in South Korea; at a seminar on investment-dispute
resolution organized by AALCO on October 20, 2018, in Tanzania; and at a
seminar on December 3, 2018, in Washington, D.C., in which the World
Bank and ICSID participated.26 The model instrument was selected as a
“highly commended” runner-up for the 2019 Financial Times Innovative
Lawyers Awards.27
23. Id.
24. Int’l Energy Charter, Model Instrument on Management of Investment Disputes, CCDEC
2018 26 INV (Dec. 23, 2018), https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/
CCDECS/2018/CCDEC201826_-_INV_Adoption_by_correspondence_-_Model_Instrument_on_
Management_of_Investment_Disputes.
25. See Decree of 2016: Decreto 125 crea comité interministerial para la defensa del estado
en controversias internacionales en materias relativas a inversiones y regula la coordinación para
la solución de dichas controversias (Chile); Regulation of 2009: Reglamento para la Prevención y
Atención de las Controversias Internacionales en Materia de Comercio e Inversión N° 35452-MP-
COMEX (Costa Rica); Decisions of 2013 and 2014: Odluku o osnivanju Me uresornog povjer-
enstva za postupanje po zahtjevima stranih ulagaca vezanim uz sporove koji proizlaze iz dvos-
tranih ugovora Republike Hrvatske iz podruc̆ja poticanja i zas̆tite ulaganja (Croat.); Decree of
2015: Decreto No. 303-15 (Dom. Rep.); Legal provision of 2017: Noteikumi Nr. 228 Pārstāvı̄bas
nodros ināsanas kārtı̄ba starptautisko ieguldı̄jumu strı̄du izskatı̄sanā (Lat.); Law of 2006: Ley N°
28933 que establece el Sistema de coordinación y respuesta del estado en controversias interna-
cionales de inversion (Peru); and Decision of 2014: Decision No. 04/2014/QD-TTg of the Prime
Minister on Promulgation of Regulation on Coordination in Resolution of International Invest-
ment Disputes (Viet.). See also Decree of 2013, Resolution of 2014, and Directive of 2016:
Decreto 1939 de 2013 por el cual se reglamenta la atención de controversias internacionales de
inversion, Resolución 305 de 2014, Directiva Presidencial N. 2 de 2016 (Colom.), and Regulation
of 2014 amended in 2016:
(
) (Kyrg.).
26. Seminar on Prevention and Management of Investment Disputes, INT’L ENERGY CHAR-
TER, https://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/events/prevention-and-management-of-invest
ment-disputes (last updated Dec. 11, 2018).
27. Ranking: Creating a New Standard, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/
content/672aaa1a-d093-11e9-99a4-b5ded7a7fe3f.
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The model instrument seeks to provide government officials with a
comprehensive overview of the legal, institutional, and practical issues that
need to be considered for the effective management of investment disputes.
It also emphasizes the importance and usefulness of negotiation, mediation,
and conciliation (which should be properly considered in a strategy to deal
with a dispute), providing a clear and express legal basis for their applica-
tion as well as the authority to settle investment disputes. Governments may
voluntarily use the model instrument as a reference or guide to develop or
update their internal legal framework for managing investment disputes,
taking into account their specific administrative needs as well as cultural
and legal particularities.
The model instrument covers as many practical issues as possible
based on the experiences and needs of consulted government officials who
deal with investment disputes. It is for the state implementing the model
instrument to decide the level of detail needed and whether some issues
would be better developed in ancillary documents. The Energy Charter Sec-
retariat stands ready to provide technical assistance and capacity building
for governments willing to consider the implementation of the model instru-
ment. So far Albania, Azerbaijan, The Gambia, and Nigeria have seconded
officials at the Energy Charter Secretariat to consider their instruments
based on the model.
The model instrument can be implemented (establishing an internal
legal framework for the management of investment disputes) by way of a
protocol, decree, decision, law, order, or any other instrument that states
consider more fit according to their legal system. Nevertheless, the Energy
Charter Secretariat advises that the internal framework be introduced by
some sort of binding document to facilitate effective compliance since
sometimes it is difficult to ensure that nonbinding policies and recommen-
dations are applied (especially since they can easily be put aside in a vola-
tile political environment). Government officials need to have the legal
certainty of the internal framework’s application and its compatibility with
other relevant legal sources (such as the constitution). Furthermore, some
states have introduced a specific provision in their internal legal framework
declaring that the prevention and management of investment disputes are
matters of “public interest” (e.g., Costa Rica28 and the Dominican Repub-
lic,29 while Chile refers to them as a “key and strategic matter”30), and at
least one state has included a provision on liability in case of omission or
28. Considerando II, Reglamento para la Prevención y Atención de las Controversias Interna-
cionales en Materia de Comercio e Inversión N° 35452-MP-COMEX (Costa Rica).
29. Art. 1, Decreto No. 303-15, Feb. 20, 2015 (Dom. Rep.).
30. Considerando 6, Decreto 125 crea comité interministerial para la defensa del estado en
controversias internacionales en materias relativas a inversiones y regula la coordinación para la
solución de dichas controversias (Chile).
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breach of the provisions of the internal legal framework (e.g., the Domini-
can Republic).31
The model instrument focuses on establishing a lead agency or respon-
sible body and managing investment disputes. This allows states the flexi-
bility to decide whether to address conflict prevention and management in a
separate instrument or set of rules and whether the same responsible body
or lead agency in charge of managing investment disputes should also be in
charge of coordinating conflict prevention and management. Nevertheless,
the model instrument also contains several tools that, together with the es-
tablishment of a responsible body or lead agency, can be useful for conflict
prevention and conflict management, such as centralization of information,
information sharing, coordination, and an early-warning mechanism.
IV. HOW DOES THE MODEL INSTRUMENT FOR MANAGEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES FIT WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL
INITIATIVES?
On April 1, 2019, the Energy Charter Secretariat (with the participa-
tion of ICSID, the World Bank, UNCTAD, and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA)) organized an interactive workshop on preven-
tion of investment disputes as a side event to UNCITRAL’s Working Group
III (ISDS Reform) spring meeting in New York.32 The workshop aimed to
identify, with the help of government officials, synergies among different
international initiatives and remaining gaps. It showed that the model in-
strument was addressing a specific area not yet addressed by any other in-
ternational institution or initiative: how to introduce an effective internal
legal framework to manage investment disputes that also provides the legal
basis for the use of mediation and negotiation. The model instrument was
also considered as complementary with the other relevant initiative at the
international level: the Systemic Investment Response Mechanism (SIRM)
of the World Bank.
The SIRM focuses only on the specific grievances or conflicts (not
disputes) that, based on the investors’ indications, place an investment pro-
ject at risk of leaving the country or place a planned expansion at risk of
cancellation. It provides a tracking tool to help states monitor and track the
economic impact (amount of investment and number of jobs at risk) of
those grievances or conflicts. The World Bank is currently considering sec-
tor-specific SIRMs, including for the energy sector. As a first step, the
World Bank and the Energy Charter Secretariat are working in 2021 on
31. Art. 16, Decreto No. 303-15, Feb. 20, 2015 (Dom. Rep.).
32. Brainstorming Session on Preventing Investment Disputes, INT’L ENERGY CHARTER,
https://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/events/brainstorming-session-on-preventing-invest
ment-disputes (last updated Mar. 19, 2019).
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empirical research on the experience of the energy sector in preventing in-
vestment disputes.
On the other hand, the model instrument of the International Energy
Charter is focused on the management of all types of investment disputes
(though it also contains some useful tools for conflict prevention and man-
agement), regardless of their size or economic impact. It provides for an
early, independent assessment of a dispute to ascertain the most effective
course of action, including providing the express legal basis for negotiation
and mediation.
V. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTORS?
While conflict-prevention tools can be deployed unilaterally (though
some of them could also be part of the contractual arrangement between the
host state and the investor), it usually takes two parties to solve conflicts
(more if the friction or conflict also involves the local community). There-
fore, it is not enough for the state to introduce conflict-prevention and
-management tools if the foreign investor is not willing and able to engage.
In May and June 2019, the Energy Charter Secretariat discussed the
potential use of the model instrument for companies at the In-House Legal
Conference of the European Company Lawyers Association (ECLA) and
the International Energy Charter Industry Advisory Panel (IAP).33 It is be-
coming more frequent for big transnational companies to have internal poli-
cies on managing commercial conflicts and disputes, including alternative
dispute-resolution mechanisms. However, those policies and mechanisms
do not usually apply to conflicts with foreign governments, and small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) do not usually have similar mechanisms.
In addition, some companies have already started to introduce some
sort of local grievance redress mechanisms to deal with project-related con-
flicts with the local population (as requested by several international finan-
cial institutions) and due-diligence plans required by national legislation to
prevent severe impacts on human rights, the health and safety of individu-
als, and the environment.34 Nevertheless, those tools are not comprehensive
since they target only a specific set of conflicts.
33. For a current list of IAP members (including companies involved with the energy sector
from more than thirty countries, intergovernmental organizations, and international business as-
sociations), see Composition of the Energy Industry Advisory Panel (IAP), INT’L ENERGY CHAR-
TER (June 19, 2020), https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/IAP/
Composition_of_the_Energy_Charter_Industry_Advisory_Panel_19-06-2020.pdf.
34. For example, one French law requires parent companies of groups with at least 5,000
employees in France, or 10,000 employees worldwide, to establish, implement, and publish rea-
sonable vigilance measures (such as risk mapping, mitigation, and taking preventive actions) and
to ensure effective and efficient implementation of such measures through alert mechanisms and
monitoring systems. See Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des
societes meres et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre (1) [Law No. 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on
the Duty of Vigilance of Parent Companies and Ordering Companies (1)], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST212.txt unknown Seq: 13  3-JUN-21 12:42
478 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
Therefore, it would be useful for companies to consider having their
own internal framework to prevent and manage conflicts and disputes with
foreign governments. However, for it to be successful, persons regularly
interacting with foreign investors and government officials in relation to a
contract or investment should be familiar with the internal framework. A
successful policy depends not only on its design but also on its effective
implementation at all levels. Therefore, it is advised that the internal frame-
work be introduced by some sort of binding document to facilitate effective
compliance.
Some of the relevant tools companies may consider including in their
internal policy or framework to deal with investment conflicts and disputes
are the following:
A. Conflict-prevention tools:
• Stakeholder mapping to identify and assess the relevant actors
involved with the investment or contract.
• Ex ante conflict assessment and monitoring of the sensitive
issues identified. This conflict assessment should not be frozen
in time and should be regularly updated to include, for exam-
ple, an early analysis of later policy changes affecting the
investment.
• An organized, centralized, and consistent database with
problems, conflicts, and disputes experienced in the past (not
only in the host country but in any other foreign investment
the company had), as well as the circumstances in which they
happened, the reaction to them, and which solutions worked.
• Capacity building: apart from the previously mentioned work-
shops, the Energy Charter Secretariat has organized several
trainings for government officials and the industry dealing
with both investment mediation (with the support of CEDR,
IMI, and ICSID) and investment arbitration (with the support
of ICSID, SCC, and the PCA).
B. Conflict- and dispute-management tools:
• An early-alert mechanism with a list of steps to take at the
sign of any conflict, with a clear timeline and some flexibility
to adapt to circumstances. A poor interaction and deficient in-
formation sharing within a company could result in the escala-
tion of conflicts. Depending on the corporate culture of the
company, effective exchange of information could be even
more complex than within some governments.
• Clear internal coordination with the identified person, depart-
ment, or unit that should be notified of any conflict and would
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017, https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000034290626&categorieLien=ID.
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be in charge of negotiation, mediation, or arbitration. This en-
tity would be the equivalent of the responsible body or lead
agency in the case of states. This person, department, or unit
should have either the authority to settle or direct access to the
person or body that has that authority.
• Early, independent assessment of the conflict to ascertain the
best (most effective) course of action, including using any rel-
evant grievance mechanism (e.g., ombudsman, joint commit-
tees), as well as direct or assisted negotiation, mediation, or
any other mechanism for an amicable resolution.
• An early strategic-communications plan and an identified
spokesperson to deal with the public, political, and media in-
terest in the conflict or dispute.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST212.txt unknown Seq: 15  3-JUN-21 12:42
480 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
